Category Archives: Foreign Policy

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Non-Proliferation Affairs, Russian Affairs

How to Handle Russian Weapons Exports

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When the United States unceremoniously dethroned Qaddafi, a dictator of unimaginable brutality, a people were finally free to choose their own destiny. And the Russians lost one of their largest arms smugglers in the region. After all it was Qaddafi who, with the help of the Russians, imported massive amounts of Kalashnikov rifles and rocket propelled grenades among the other panoply of war. These were given to Qaddafi at a steeply discounted price. Qaddafi in turn sold these weapons to rebels and the governments which were trying to quell their rebellions at enormous markups. We know this because of the serial numbers that accompanied the weapons (as well as the story of Viktor Bout). By the time the 2000’s had come around war was endemic in western Africa (Sierra Leon, Liberia, Cote D’Ivoire you name it), and Qaddafi had created his own veritable cottage industry. This cycle of weaponry for diamonds and gold came to a screeching halt when in the summer of 2011 Qaddafi was killed in a brutal manner by the people that he oppressed for over 40 years. This weapons vacuum which has yet to be completely filled by any one entity, left the Russians with few options to make up the surge the likes of which was found in Qaddafi, until Syria arrived.

Syria acts as one of the most successful conduits of Russian weapons systems and small arms since the end of the Cold War. By most estimates Bashar al-Assad has purchased in excess of $1 billion in weaponry from Russia since the wars beginning, as his economy lies in ruins. Numbers like this however are chump change when you consider the amount of possibly unfulfilled deliveries to countries such as Algeria which, as of 2009, had $5.2 billion in unfulfilled orders from the Russians this includes some of their most advanced air defense systems as well as Jet fighters. If this is any indication of how sales are going in Africa alone, business must be good indeed. Although not good enough, since the Russians have since sent some of the same advanced air defense systems to the Syrians who are in the middle of a brutal civil war. The strategic interest in Tartus, a sea port, for the Russians can’t be discounted; however the amount of prestige that they have expended on Al-Assad could come at a price even heavier than the Russians can handle down the road.

They can find new end markets outside the North Africa and the Middle East (MENA) region however sanctions and emerging super powers such as China make that a difficult proposition. Russia recently stated as its goal to become the world’s largest arms supplier. And though statements such as that come as a welcome respite to African despots, guerilla insurgents, and petty tyrants, I’m sure that when that was read aloud in the West a collective rolling of the eyes was no doubt the first reaction in their respective capitals. Assessments aside, the current negotiations in the Security Council, for a use of force measure to be included in the currently debated resolution needs a proper amount of leverage an order to arm twist the Russians to agreeing to it. That’s why I propose that the U.S. in concert with its allies find a way to impede Russian arms sales not just in Syria, but throughout the world. As I mentioned earlier Algeria has $5.2 billion in pending orders with the Russians if they can somehow be persuaded to cancel, postpone, or possibly even renege on prior agreements and buy European weaponry, that would go a long way in this arm twisting business with minimal effort. One point of cooperation which may convince the Russians to cut their losses is the proposed North Korean-South Korean Pipeline or PNG. This pipeline would supply gas to South Korea from Russia via North Korea. Its worth is estimated at $100 billion dollars. Another area of cooperation that the Russians are most assuredly interested in is the security for the upcoming 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic Games. The latest reports from the Caucasus region are that Islamic extremist plan on disrupting the Olympic Games by any means necessary. By providing adequate security in concert with the Russians we can build trust among one another and also help further quell Islamic extremism in a region which is rife with it. These are just some of the examples of how U.S.-Russian cooperation can be fruitful for both sides.

The conclusion is this: Russian must not be allowed to make a mockery of the international order, indeed international norms and common law. If we hope to prevent al-Assad’s mass graves and prevent the sort of internecine conflict that we’ve seen in Sierra Leone for instance, a la Qaddafi, we must be prepared to confront the Russians at all stages of statecraft and convince the world to reject Putin’s autocratic bent in favor of a more prescient and tangible American path. While at the same time it’s also important to understand that cooperation is possible between the two powers but only by working hand in hand and not pitting one against the other can we make the world a safer place for all of God’s creations.

Middle Eastern Affairs

Syrian Military and Diplomatic Initiatives

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Updated this post to include the text of military options in Syria:

The military option of training and advising must be viewed in the context of a broader strategic vision against al-Assad, and the forces loyal to him. By all accounts as of today al-Assad has regained ground in most of the major strategic arteries which feed Damascus and keeps it continuing indefinitely. If the rebels, whose numbers have been estimated in excess of 80,000 men, are to be trained and advised then they have to have the right equipment. The president has authorized weapons shipments and training for the rebels (in Jordan), and while the CIA no doubt has assets in the north of the country, this alone is not enough.  A no fly-zone which has been promulgated by the likes of Sen. McCain, and Graham are should not be entirely out of the question. In fact if the rebels are to hold onto their gains while steadily progressing to Damascus from Homs then the Idea of a no-fly zone in the upper hinterlands of the country from Aleppo till following the Euphrates heading east in Syrian territory is a good one. This action alone would allow the rebels to hang on to precious supply routes without the risk of being outflanked while continuing southward towards Damascus.

In the event that Homs is recaptured by the rebels I think that we face a juncture in the fighting that will force us to ultimately have to determine what our military objectives are.

The first one seems simple but is rather not, A further push down the western end of the country reclaiming Qusayr and eventually retaking Damascus. I’m assuming the American military establishment in the pentagon have this in mind since they are training forces across the border in neighboring Jordan in the hopes that Al-Assad will let his guard down south of Damascus once he sees that the rebels have retaken Homs and Qusayr. This is simply not going to be the case. I think we should remember al-Assad is a Baathist like Saddam Hussein, and his security forces the Fedayeen are some of the most fearsome in the region. Along with Hizbollah, Iranian Republican Guard Corps (IRGC) troops and guidance from Russian Spetsnaz this is a daunting task indeed.

The second logical idea is to after capturing Homs and Qusayr is to grind down al-Assad’s forces in a slug match with air support from America or NATO. This is another mistake in reasoning I believe, since al-Assad has many types of anti air deterrents be they soviet era Mig-29’s, MANPADS, SA-7’s, or the much feared shipment of Russian S-300’s. This along with the sheer density of Damascus makes a frontal assault far too costly and not worth the risk. One noteworthy tactic that I believe is just beginning to be used is the spreading out of hit and run style attacks, from sea ports in al-Assad’s hometown, to the far reaches of eastern Syria near the Iraqi border. These types of attacks would make any mad dash noteworthy yet doomed to fail since the rebel forces are not concentrated on one specific target. In my opinion any gains using this tactic will not hold so long as Assad has access to the major arteries that all coalesce at Homs. And as Frederick Hohenstaufen once said: “He who defends everything, defends nothing.”

The third, and final which is my own personal best idea, is to retake Homs and Qusayr and deprive Damascus of any routes to receive additional supplies. By looking at the map it becomes clear why Assad went on the offensive to prevent the rebels from keeping Qusayr and Homs. There are routes which run directly from Beirut to Qusayr which allowed for Syrian allies to transport goods directly to the front in Homs expeditiously. And also by recapturing Homs he (Assad) was able to have one congruous state that was aligned with the rest of his territories to the only ports Syria has in the North West of the country. For military reasons the fight should be taken to Assad in Homs as soon as possible. This will allow for the rebels to cut off these vital ports from Assad and the rebels can then use them as their own. And by capturing Qusayr you force Assad to take a very dangerous path from Beirut almost straight to Damascus, something he’d rather not do. By then circumvallating Damascus and not letting anything come in or go out of Damascus the rebels would then be able to negotiate with Assad surrender or a Syrian Rebel Putsch as it is so called.

This post contains a power point entitled “Syria: Military Choices, Diplomatic Decisions, and Strategic Imperatives “. This is a retrospective of what I believe to be the U.S. governments choices in Syria as well as a third option (with map) which is my own personal decision planning idea. Syria Military and Diplomatic Options Web Version

Middle Eastern Affairs

Syrian Diplomatic Putsch

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It seems to me that it is absolutely imperative that we bring Bashar al-Assad to the negotiating table. These negotiations must be conducted at the highest levels possible on all sides. It only makes sense to at the very least confront al-Assad since he’s the one that is conducting the war. It serves a multirole purpose since from the perspective of the world we seem to be in a cycle of overthrowing strongmen in the Middle East beginning with Saddam Hussein. To allay any fears that this is simply another case of America having its way in the region we must make a full-throated and senior appeal to the Assad administration so as to have legitimacy on our side. Assad seems to be stuck in a bubble that is continually feeding him information that he quite frankly wants to hear; be it true or not. This has only helped to harden his position and has prevented any sort of tangible progress toward an agreed settlement of the civil war. It’s also worth noting that al-Assad comes from a dynasty that had ruled Syria since the 1970’s. This means that his “cult of personality” has been entrenched in Syrian society for at least that long. This makes an overthrow by the Syrian rebels that much more difficult to render. Unlike Saddam, Mubarak, Qaddafi, or even the Taliban al-Assad inherited his power from his dad Hafez. This makes it all the more difficult to convince the people within his immediate vicinity that he should “step down”. After all as far as al-Assad is concerned he’s the one that is the rightful ruler of Syria, and so it should be us not him who kowtow’s to demands to stop the bloodshed, and prevent this wholesale slaughter from happening anymore. Enter Russia. It’s not so much that they are sympathetic to his cause so much as the Russian federation is sympathetic to al-Assad’s crown authority and what diluting that would mean for not only Syria, not only Russia, but the rest of the world as well. If the United States and its allies are allowed to overthrow a sovereign ruler without Just War casus belli ante, this could set a whole new precedent for how future engagement is settled throughout the world. Or so the thinking goes. If we are to make any progress in talks we must take into consideration these factors at the least, particularly when dealing with Russia; and especially when dealing with the Assad regime.