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Iranian Nuclear Ambitions (2003-2024)

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Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to eliminate its stockpile of medium-enriched uranium, cut its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 98%, and reduce by about two-thirds the number of its gas centrifuges for 13 years. For the next 15 years, Iran will only enrich uranium up to 3.67%. Iran also agreed not to build any new heavy-water facilities for the same period of time.[1] A nuclear weapon uses a fissile material to cause a nuclear chain reaction. The most commonly used materials have been uranium 235 (U-235) and plutonium 239 (Pu-239). Both uranium 233 (U-233) and reactor-grade plutonium have also been used.[2][3][4]

With Separative Work Units Estimated to begin production of fissile material at about 35 SWU, the estimated amount of fissile material needed to produce one bomb is estimated to be about 30 kilograms, with perfect centrifuge production of such fissile material accomplished after the use of about 50,000 unique centrifuges.[5][6] This is thought to precipitate from the production of crude IR-1 centrifuges which have a Uranium Produced to Centrifuge Use Ratio of 0.0867% (Uranium: Centrifuge Ratio).[7] This is a certain disadvantage for any country which hopes to produce an indigenous supply of fissile material, for any illicit nuclear program, and its activities. This means that an order to produce the previously estimated Separative Work Units needed to attain 30 Kilograms of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU), the program in question would have to expend an inordinate number of centrifuges of the IR-1 grade, which would add up to something of the order of magnitude of at least 122,268,924 Centrifuges, again of the IR-1 generation, which is the crudest workable generation of centrifuges available.

It’s estimated that the Islamic Republic of Iran has about 19,500 of these installed in a cascading assay at any one time.[8] Numbers like these continue for some time when talking about the Uranium to Centrifuge Ratio for less crude centrifuge devices, IR-2, .15937%, topping out at 33,270,455 IR-2 Centrifuges alone an order to produce enough Uranium for one bomb (30 Kgs). IR-3, a respectable centrifuge technology that requires 9,053,185 to produce the same amount of fissile material, giving it a Uranium to Centrifuge Cannibalization Ratio of 0.292843%.

Amongst these lesser centrifuge technologies, it is presumed from testimony from inspectors, and reports from the IAEA, as well as intelligence agencies, that the maximum number of Centrifuges which can be installed at any one time is north of 15,000 per assay, for these centrifuge technologies alone.

This would explain the IR-1 Assay which has over 15,000 centrifuges installed (19,500).[9] 

While IR-4 has a Uranium to Centrifuge Ratio of 0.538099% Cannibalized, meaning that the number of centrifuges needed to produce the requisite amount of LEU fissile material drops considerably to 2,463,451. However, it’s thought that the Iranians only have 5,000 of the more high-tech IR-4 in existence.

But this number is up for discussion and it here posited by me, that the number of centrifuges which are currently put into production by Iran, number at least 10,000 total, with IR-3 being the most plentiful of them all. This means that by most estimates 7,800 may be the maximum declared allotment by the Ayatollah and his regime, but the figure varies accordingly due to the size of the program, meaning suspected undeclared facilities, and the scope and nature of the program as well.[10] After all, it was Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Fedayeen, who were suspected of concealing what was in fact a defunct Nuclear Weapons Program, on trailers which were supposedly on mobile platforms throughout the desert in 2003.[11]

The number of centrifuges thought to be acquired by Iran, and their efficiency, therefore, begin to deviate from each other dramatically, after this. With highly advanced IR-5, and IR-6 Centrifuges collapsing to no greater than 1,000 for the foreseeable future, after implementation of the JCPOA, and even yet still Cannibalized Yields accelerating to only 1.8% with Centrifuges, and Centrifuges used, numbering in the hundreds of thousands.

The production of these centrifuges, and their capabilities was summed up in Nuclear Crises with North Korea and Iran, a 2019 book by Robert S. Litwak, from the Woodrow Wilson Center at Princeton University which sums up the state of the program, and the issues succinctly:

“Centrifuges are essential equipment for uranium enrichment, the multistage industrial process in which natural uranium is converted into special material capable of sustaining a nuclear chain reaction. Natural uranium occurs in two forms—U-238, making up 99 percent of the element, and the lighter U-235, accounting for less than 1 percent. But the latter is a fissionable isotope that emits energy when split. Uranium ore is crushed into a powder, refined, and then reconstituted into a solid form, known as “yellowcake.” The yellowcake is then superheated and transformed into a Nuclear Crises with North Korea and Iran: gas, uranium hexafluoride (UF6). That gas is passed through a centrifuge and spun at high speed, with the U-238 drawn to the periphery and extracted, while the lighter U-235 clusters in the center and is collected. The collected U-235 material is passed through a series of centrifuges, known as a cascade, with each successive pass-through increasing the percentage of U-235. Uranium for a nuclear reactor should be enriched to contain approximately 3 percent uranium-235, whereas weapons-grade uranium should ideally contain at least 90 percent. Iran developed indigenous facilities to support each phase of the uranium enrichment process: two uranium ore mines, whose reserves could produce 250-300 nuclear weapons, according to U.S. intelligence; a yellowcake production facility; a facility for Iran’s uranium enrichment facility at Natanz (aerial view) From Transformational to Transactional Diplomacy converting yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride gas in Esfahan; and two enrichment sites, Natantz and Fordow, with 19,000 centrifuges, of which some 10,000 were operational. They were predominantly the first-generation IR-1 model, although Iran had begun installing the more sophisticated IR-2 model, which is more reliable and estimated to have six times the output of IR1s. The industrial-scale Natanz site, located 200 miles south of Tehran, could potentially house 50,000 centrifuges. The Fordow enrichment site near Qom is too small to be Economically rational as part of a civil nuclear program and is invulnerable to a military strike because it is deeply buried. Those attributes, as well as its location on a Revolutionary Guard base, aroused concern that its intended purpose was to receive low-enriched uranium produced at Natanz for further enrichment to weapons-grade material.”[12]

Figure 10 Fick’s Equation, Courtesy of National Research Nuclear University (Russia), Nuclear Reactor Physics Basics, Yury Volkov (Instructor), Coursera.org, Accessed On: 2/25/2024

This extant, which was provided by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Public Policy, gives a clear and concise explanation of the basis for ongoing nuclear negotiations, which have currently reached an impasse, as of June 2021.

Add to that a resourceful, and diligent case study of the Ayatollah’s finances in Iran. And it’s estimated that he personally has accumulated over $US 350 Billion Dollars, in personal wealth, over the course of time since the signing of the JCPOA agreement, and the wars in both Syria, Yemen, as well as Gaza. This summation, the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Public Policy Extant, however, does not include the existence of undeclared sites, which may be yet smaller in scope, but could number in the tens or more. The exclusionary nature of the Iranian Nuclear Program, along with its undeclared assets, and facilities, is one of the historical hallmarks of covert nuclear programs around the world, and is what makes it so dangerous. It should be noted however that the main conduits of the Nuclear Program, the Uranium and Plutonium Milling Mines outside of the processing facilities, including Gchine, and Saghand, as per News reports, are no longer functioning, owing to the laborious processes the Iranians have gone through to produce Nuclear Fissile Materials, and the limited capabilities which they have been able to covertly develop, after its acquisition.[13] If true, this revelation should be of the utmost of issues which the Americans, and the other P5+1 interlocutors can use to leverage Iranian compliance with their nuclear program. As the lack of raw fissionable material, negates the programs efficacy for the purposes of exploiting current technologies for the development of Nuclear Fission Weapons. And the inclusion of sensitive monitoring equipment, such as cameras, and other positive scoring sensors, and devices, at these, and other mining, and milling technology sites, must be included in any further discussions of the renegotiation of the JCPOA, and its compliance regime.

Figure 11 CERN Compact Muon Solenoid (CMS) Experiment at Light Hadron Collider #2, Cessy, France, Courtesy of the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN)

As for experimental centrifuges which Iran has under its command, the introduction of IR-6s, and IR-7’s was at first thought to completely transform the character and nature of the Iranian nuclear program, and the threat it poses. However, after initial analyses were conducted by western intelligence communities, using lasers pointed at the heat emanating from suspected nuclear sites, it was discovered that the Iranians are enriching at only a slightly more efficient level, and that the amount of these so-called experimental centrifuges must not number in less than 500 totals.

Nevertheless, when they are able to acquire these more advanced centrifuges, the Assay really only begin to decrease to so called super efficiencies at the IR-8 and above. That’s not to say that the amount of Enriched Uranium produced by these centrifuges is negligible, with Cannibalized Assays reported at 11.27%, and 20.71% Respectively, these technologies, should they ever fall into the Government of Iran’s Hands could precipitate another nuclear crisis.

And, while I suspect that the technology already exist. The added knowhow, such as Krytron Switching, and other light, and gas based, vaporous, diaphanous, vaporizing devices. Needed an order to perfect certain Nuclear Fission, and thus Weaponization technologies. I’ve concluded they may not have mastered the knowhow of.  

Figure 12 CERN Light Hadron Collider (b) (LHCb) ALICE Propulsion Experiments. (Image Courtesy of CERN)

Figure 13 CERN ALICE pPb Heavy Ion Collisions Experiments, Courtesy of the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN)

These numbers which are articulated in the above section on capabilities, do not negate the presence of current Iranian enrichment capabilities, indeed by the time the JCPOA negotiations began in 2015, it was already revealed by the Iranian side, that they possessed enough enriched Uranium to make at least five (5) nuclear weapons. The numbers on cannibalized arrays simply relate to the capabilities of their current centrifuge campaign for their Nuclear Weapons Program, and is indicative of the Iranian sides inability to progress past certain technological thresholds.       

[1] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Comprehensive_Plan_of_Action

 

[2]  Holdren, John; Bunn, Matthew (1997). “Managing Military Uranium and Plutonium in the United States and the Former Soviet Union”. Annual Review of Energy and the Environment. 22: 403–496. doi: 10.1146/annurev.energy.22.1.403.

 

[3] Barnaby, Frank (5 March 2014). Barnaby; Holdstock, Douglas (eds.). Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Retrospect and Prospect. p. 25. ISBN 9781135209933

 

[4] Matthew; Holdren, John P. “Managing military uranium and plutonium in the United States and the Former Soviet Union” (PDF). pp. 403–409.

 

[5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Separative_work_units

 

[6] “Explainer: How close is Iran to producing a nuclear bomb?”, Francois Murphy, Reuters.com, Found At: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-explainer/explainer-how-close-is-iran-to-producing-a-nuclear-bomb-idUSKBN2880NU

 

[7] This ratio is made by taking the amount of Uranium needed for feedstock and dividing it by the number of centrifuges used, an order to obtain 30 Kilograms of High Enriched Uranium. For actual numbers used see the Appendix.

 

[8] Explainer: How close is Iran to producing a nuclear bomb? François Murphy, Reuters.com, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-explainer/explainer-how-close-is-iran-to-producing-a-nuclear-bomb-idUSKBN2880NU

[9] Ibid.

 

[10] The Logic of Restoring Compliance With the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal, Arms Control Association, Vol. 14, Issue 2, February 16th, 2022; Found At: https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2022-02/logic-restoring-compliance-2015-iran-nuclear-deal?emci=b29c911a-ad8e-ec11-a507-281878b83d8a&emdi=326f4403-378f-ec11-a507-281878b83d8a&ceid=15330559

 

[11] Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, with Addendums (Duelfer Report), Iraq Survey Group (ISG), Central Intelligence Agency, April 25th, 2005, found at: https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-DUELFERREPORT/, Accessed On: 02/16/2022

 

[12] Nuclear Crises with North Korea and Iran: From Transformational to Transactional Diplomacy, Pgs. 83-85, Robert S. Litwak, Princeton University Press, 2019

 

[13] Is Iran running out of yellowcake? By David Albright, Jacqueline Shire, and Paul Brannan, February 11, 2009, Institute for Science and International Security, Found At: https://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Iran_Yellowcake_11Feb2009.pdf, Accessed: 06/06/2021

Middle Eastern Affairs

Blood and Treasure in the Middle East

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The crossroads of the global oil trade lay principally in a tiny strip of water called the Persian Gulf. Here no less than eight(8) countries Iraq, Kuwait, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain; export their highly prized light sweet crude through this small channel of water. And though most are friendly countries, one; Iran, is an outright enemy of the United States. With Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons possibly coming to a head in the near future, the safety and reliability of this pristine waterway comes into question. And with the strait of Hormuz separating the Arabian peninsula and Iran by just fifteen miles it becomes all the more urgent to guarantee the safety of the resources which run through it. In short, a strategic answer is needed to address the amount of resources emanating throughout the region.

Action should be taken before a crisis breaks out in the region that would disrupt global oil supplies and place a heavy burden not just on the U.S. economy but  the global economy as a whole. The options are few. However as of today (9/1/13) The Arab League just endorsed a western backed “solution” to the “Humanitarian Disaster” in Syria. The Syrian civil war which is entering its third year of strife and has claimed in excess of 100,000 lives through both conventional and chemical weaponry. This situation (Syria) on its face may not seem like the most prudent place for America to flex its military might, after all Iraq is Syria’s next door neighbor. Syria also has competing factions in it who are all vying for a stake in a post Bashaar al-Assad Syria. These parties include the Al-Nusra front, a hard line Islamist faction that is de facto Al-Qaeda branded; the Kurdish peoples of the north who already enjoy a level of autonomy which they have not seen in decades; and the Free Syrian Army numbering up to 80,000 strong which has General Idris as its de facto leader. There are also the Al-Assad supporters or ultra royalist as I like to call them that are the Baath party of Syria, and at their most hardcore are Fedayeen, and Hizbollah willing to become human shields to protect the al-Assad family, and Damascus at all cost. Not the most welcoming of situations. And though this may seem like a desperate situation that perhaps America should not stick its nose into considering the brutality of the Iraq war, it is these very things that cause me to suggest that the stakes are simply too high for not only the future of peace and stability in the Middle East and north Africa (MENA), but also the energy security of the United States and its allies, and it’s not without precedent.

Iraq war 1991

In 1991 George H. W. Bush was president of the United States and Saddam Hussein had just invaded Kuwait taking control of 1/5th of all oil in the world. George H. W. Bush wanted to act immediately, unilaterally, and without congressional approval but showing jurist prudence he consulted with congress before successfully repulsing Sadaam’s invasion of Kuwait, a U.S. ally. Iraq is invaded but  Sadaam is not toppled signaling a policy of deterrence rather than regime change. The war was over in less than 100 days with minimal casulties. However in a sign of miscommunication between the northern Iraqi Kurdish community and the United States an uprising is began with the hopes of establishing a unified autonomus Kurdish state. The U.S. withdraws and  Sadaam gases his own people in one of the worst chemical weapons attacks of the latter half of the 20th century. This act does not go unnoticed by the congress of the United States, as the Kurds to the north, and Shiites to the south are soon thereafter, through an act of congress, protected from Sadaam by a no-fly zone.

Iraq War 2003

After the attacks on the world trade center on 9/11 Afghanistan is soon thereafter invaded by the United States toppling the government of the Taliban and sending the perpetrator of those heinous acts Osama Bin Laden fleeing to Tora bora. In the 2003 State of the Union address to congress,then President George W. Bush; singles out Iraq, Iran, and North Korea an “Axis of Evil”. Soon thereafter Iraq is again invaded with this time the main goal of preventing Sadaam Hussein from using weapons of mass destruction against the U.S. or any of its allies. Regime change is also one of the goals and is completed in a matter of weeks after the start of the war in March 20th 2003. The oil ministry is captured relatively quickly in the outbreak of war by American and coalition forces and soon the southern Iraqi oil fields resume energy production for Iraq though not at full capacity. Ominously though soon after the toppling of Sadaam an al-Qaeda led Iranian backed insurgency begins in earnest for what would last a total of eight years. Some would say that it still continues under the banner of a group calling itself al-Qaeda in Iraq. This war along with the still lingering war in Afghanistan would sap much need blood and treasure from the United States with very little to show for it. Until May 2011 when Osama bin Laden (OBL) is finally killed in a compound outside of Abbotabad, Pakistan that he shared with his immediate family. It should be noted that several positive things came out of Iraq as well: a brutal dictator was executed along with his sons ending a reign which stretched across several decades. The Iraqi people were finally able to choose their own leaders in a representative democracy. And two key important things happen in the world of oil transit, two pipelines were built which stretched from the oil rich cities in the north of both Kirkuk and Mosul. These pipelines would extend to in the case of Mosul; Jordan and a port city in Israel, and the Kirkuk pipeline stretched to a port city in Turkey. Both of these pipelines end at the Mediterranean coast avoiding Syria completely. Keep this in mind when we begin to talk about the idea of pipelines in Syria later on.

Syrian War (2011- )

In Syria the “Arab Spring” began to take hold in early 2011 initially as peaceful protest. However soon after a deadly crackdown the mostly Sunni majority took up arms against the Alawite Shiite ruling minority and began to fight back. This back and forth continues to this day and as of the writing of this paper (9/21/13) there is an agreement between al-Assad ally Russia, and the United States to compile and eventually destroy all of Syria’s accounted for chemical stockpiles. The United States has introduced a resolution at the U.N. which would “Hold Syria to account” should the weapons not be destroyed by mid 2014 as per scheduled. This agreement doesn’t shouldn’t be construed as an out for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad who has murdered tens of thousands of his own countrymen using conventional and chemical weapons. And as Secretary general Ban Ki Moon was recently quoted as saying, Assad should be “Held Accountable” for these monstrous acts. Also on the agenda it seems that Iran has initiated a charm offensive and has suggested that talks over a cease fire could possibly take place between Syria and the free Syrian army (FSA) in Geneva, Switzerland. This and more is really all incumbent upon how backroom discussions go at the U.N. this coming week when President Obama will address the U.N. It’s also rumored that president Obama will meet with newly elected president of Iran Rouhani if the temperature of the room is to his liking.

Syrian Blood and Treasure (2013)

These developments should not in any way negate what could be a boon in Syria for the West and the revolutionaries fighting in Syria. Namely the construction of a pipeline in Iraq oddly enough that connects to the two pipelines mentioned earlier from the southern oilfields to Mosul and Kirkuk pipelines. Then furthermore pipelines could be constructed from the Kirkuk pipeline into Syria and through what will almost assuredly be an autonomous Northern Syria bordered by turkey in the north and the Euphrates in the south.  This pipeline would them make the final connection to the Syrian port city of Latakia in the north and complete the journey of the oil by land. By diverting the oil from Kuwait and Southern Iraq from the strait of Hormuz we would gain a strategic upper-hand since then gradually less and less oil would be moving through the Persian Gulf.

The lesson is this: a diplomatic settlement in Syria should at this point in the discussions be the favored outcome. The blood and treasure already spilled and expended in Syria makes it imperative that Assad understand that the people of northern Syria have the right to exist in a state of perpetual peace much as he was use to before the civil war began to rage. The revolutionaries of the FSA must now come to the table of peace and quietly begin the discussion of a free North Syria while the iron is still hot. The consequences of a free and fully functioning northern Syria would ripple throughout the Middle East and North Africa with a cadence not seen since the death of OBL.