For its part America must wade into these difficult times with caution and a combination of carrots and sticks for all parties involved. This has already been shown with the heavy handedness that the administration has rebuked countries such as Russia, and North Korea with sanctions targeting their elite.
Beijing’s increasing power and influence in Asia, and the arguably growing danger of a serious crisis emerging in the near to medium-term over volatile issues such as Taiwan, North Korea, and several territorial disputes along China’s borders.[1]
America must stand strong against possible aggression from all parties named, response to crises on periphery more important than at first observed, response to events crucial, must regain global respect for America, leaving the big wars for the rest while we prepare for the inevitable big test for our country, prepare for counterpoised organizations to the United States’ New World Order, do not let others dictate American narrative, be prepared for parts of the world to be hostile to the U.S. for the long term, prepare for war but don’t initiate it.
So long as U.S. maintains moral high ground domino effect is obsolete much as we saw in the 1980’s with Russia in Afghanistan.
We should, however, prepare for large parts of Asia, and Africa to be in world conflict which will be Sino-Soviet in nature and will have absolutely nothing to do with the United States.
China views itself as an aspiring yet nonaggressive great power, increasingly confident yet also acutely sensitive to domestic and external challenges to its stability and status. China’s leaders, and many ordinary Chinese citizens, possess a strong memory of the nation’s supposed historical victimization and manipulation at the hands of stronger powers. Thus, they are prepared to go to significant lengths to avoid the appearance of being weak and “giving-in” to great power pressures, or of engaging in predatory or manipulative behavior themselves. Chinese leaders also evince a very strong commitment to specific basic principles and core interests, especially those principles and interests associated with the defense of China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, both of which are related closely to national dignity. This viewpoint is apparently also shared by many ordinary Chinese citizens.[2]
North Korea is a victim of their own system; toxic alliances such as Syria, and possibly China will be a negative mitigating effect on North Korea as a whole. If there is no rapprochement with South Korea there could be much suffering in North Korea and eventual undoing from Sino-Soviet war as they are forced to choose sides through coercion from both the Chinese and Russians. Expect for trend of celebrities engaging in politics to continue (think North Korea); expect mostly celebrities from Hollywood, and the American and European Political intelligentsia, to be disgruntled by new administration in U.S., will take to spying and openly soliciting foreign governments (besides North Korea) with so-called expertise a la Edward Snowden, should not be a problem so long as U.S. has positive narrative.
In the end it will ultimately be up to America to chart its own destiny. We can be confrontational and get caught up in the Sino-Soviet sphere of conflict. Or we can take the high road and refuse to give into Russian, and Sino intransigence while simultaneously solving some of the world’s most dangerous issues such as the North Korean Question, Pakistani-Indian relations, and the Middle East.
By not Kowtowing to pressures from either the Russian’s and their neo-imperial ambitions, or the ascendancy of a less than peaceful China, America can act as a beacon of light and a counter weight to these two very real, and significant second tier powers whose Hegemonic designs will eventually lead them to confrontation.
I would like to end with a quote from a paper Robert Jervis wrote for World Politics in 1978:
“The security dilemma is at its most vicious when commitments, strategy, or technology dictate that the only route to security lies through expansion. Status-quo powers must then act like aggressors; the fact that they would gladly agree to forego the opportunity for expansion in return for guarantees for their security has no implications for their behavior. Even if expansion is not sought as a goal in itself, there will be quick and drastic changes in the distribution of territory and influence.”[3]
In the Director of National Intelligence’s Global Trends 2030 Report the idea of relative U.S. decline is noted. Indeed it states “The replacement of the United States by another global power and erection of a new international order seems the least likely outcome…” And goes on to say: “The emerging powers are eager to take their place at the top table of key multilateral institutions such as UN, IMF, and World Bank, but they do not espouse any competing vision. Although ambivalent and even resentful of the US-led international order, they have benefited from it and are more interested in continuing their economic development and political consolidation than contesting US leadership. In addition, the emerging powers are not a bloc; thus they do not have any unitary alternative vision. Their perspectives—even China’s—are more keyed to shaping regional structures.”[4]
This likelihood is the precedent that I cite for my reasoning as to why I foresee a U.S. that is still relatively much more powerful than either China, or Russia, but is unable to control their actions any longer due to the rise in technological prowess, as well as military advancements.
When the time comes where Russia, and China begin to build multilateral institutions for their exclusive benefit (as is already the case), and they feel that they are no longer subject to the global political and economic institutions of the status quo Global Order.
This is when we can begin to see the unraveling of regions in which you see the aforementioned states’ dominance is most felt.
This unraveling could entail anything from a virtual wall of fact distortion placed by the dominating state over itself and any cooperative satellites; to a physical travel restriction by these states against U.S. allied countries, similar to the iron curtain during the cold war; to the onset of war, as we’ve seen in Ukraine, between Russia, it’s satellites, and China, and its satellites.
With the United States playing the role of mediator between the two, while unable to travel to those countries in the world due to the enactment of trade, cultural, and travel barriers between the warring factions, and the United States and its allies.
In a September 17th, 2015 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, Admiral Harry Harris was asked by Senator Thom Tillis, (R – NC), about the time at which the United States’ qualitative advantage, in a “unfair fight” would be matched or exceeded, by the Peoples Republic of China’s quantitative advantage. In the hearing Admiral Harris said that they would have capability, assuming that the United States continued on its current trajectory, sometime in “The mid-twenty-twenties.”[5]
This assertion plays into the ideas that Robert Jervis has previously postulated and that I bring up here in relation to China, and Russia, when I say that once they no longer have anything to fear, there is the possibility of real trouble in whatever parts of the world that China and Russia consider to be in their de facto sphere of influence.
This is something that will surely become a test to the American Administration at the time as China would use its economic influence to foment revolt, while Russia can jump into the fray and militarize further conflicts which may have seemed at first to require only a deft hand at crisis management.
In fact we are able to see this panoply of more options available to Russia and China as we have seen China Militarize the South China Sea, and Russia use its military advancements to invade Ukraine, and to support the Assad regime in Syria by providing military material, knowhow, and placing boots on the ground. These extra judicial steps have been taken; China by claiming territorial rights over international waters; and Russia, inviting itself to Syria under the guise of the war on terrorism.
This is only the beginning of something that has the potential to become much more serious, namely, a global confrontation between the east and the west. All hope is not lost though for the United States, we were able to successfully find hunt and kill Osama Bin Laden, we have limited our role in Iraq, and we were able to withdraw from Afghanistan by the end of 2021.
So then what role can the United States play in this increasingly more dangerous security paradigm: Cautious and Prudent.
We as a nation cannot allow ourselves to be caught in the trap of mission creep and further conflict management issues, namely war.
We must buttress our moral consistency for this long hard slog that we could potentially see ourselves going through.
We must be vigilant and be able to project strength. This means that we cannot be tied down in a recurring litany of what some might call small wars.
But we also can’t get lost in the abyss of a large conflagration.
We must on the one hand protect our allies, and project strength.
While on the other hand we cannot and will not allow ourselves to be manipulated by Chinese, and Russian Hawks, and Generals.
This will not be easy and will take an American Administration that has the intellectual knowhow and political savvy requisite to deal with these emerging threats.
Who or what this Administration will look like, this author will leave up to the American public to decide.
[1] CHINESE NATIONAL SECURITY DECISIONMAKING UNDER STRESS, Edited by Andrew Scobell Larry M. Wortzel, CHINESE CRISIS MANAGEMENT: FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS, TENTATIVE OBSERVATIONS, AND QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE, Michael D. Swaine, p.5, September 2005
[2] CHINESE NATIONAL SECURITY DECISIONMAKING UNDER STRESS, Edited by Andrew Scobell Larry M. Wortzel, CHINESE CRISIS MANAGEMENT: FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS, TENTATIVE OBSERVATIONS, AND QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE, Michael D. Swaine, p.16, September 2005
[3] Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, Robert Jervis, Pg. 187, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009958?origin=JSTOR-pdf, 1978 Princeton University Press
[4] DNI.Gov, Office of The Director of National Intelligence, “Global Trends: 2030: Alternative Worlds”, http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/global-trends-2030, Accessed September 15th, 2015
[5] C-SPAN.org, Admiral Harry Harris, “Hearing on Maritime Security Strategy in the Asia-Pacific”, http://www.c-span.org/video/?328185-1/hearing-us-maritime-security-strategy-asiapacific, Accessed September 17th, 2015